Recent developments in U.S. policy toward Iran reflect a calculated blend of coercive force and strategic pragmatism. President Donald Trump is reportedly prepared to scale down ongoing hostilities in the Middle East provided that Washington secures its primary objectives—namely, the degradation of Iran’s naval capabilities and missile infrastructure.

This position suggests a notable shift from traditional U.S. strategic doctrine. Historically, ensuring the stability of global energy flows—particularly through the Strait of Hormuz—has been a central priority. However, current signals indicate that the United States may be willing to tolerate short-term disruptions in global energy markets if it can achieve long-term strategic advantages by weakening Iran’s military capacity.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, with a significant share of global oil shipments passing through it. A prolonged closure would typically be viewed as an unacceptable risk to the global economy. Yet Trump’s apparent willingness to conclude the conflict without reopening the strait underscores a prioritization of military outcomes over immediate systemic stability.

Parallel to this military posture is a renewed emphasis on burden-sharing. The White House has indicated that Trump is considering calling on Arab states to help finance the costs of a potential war with Iran. This approach aligns with his longstanding foreign policy doctrine, which advocates for greater financial contributions from U.S. allies in securing regional order.

Such a move carries several important geopolitical implications. First, it would deepen the involvement of Gulf states, not only politically but also economically, thereby reinforcing their dependence on U.S. security guarantees. Second, it risks intensifying regional polarization, particularly along existing geopolitical and sectarian fault lines. Third, it raises broader questions regarding the legitimacy and perceived motivations behind the conflict, especially if external financing becomes a defining feature.

At the same time, diplomatic engagement with Iran appears to be ongoing. According to White House statements, there is a marked divergence between Tehran’s public rhetoric and its private communications with U.S. officials. This suggests that Iran may be attempting to balance domestic political signaling with the realities of external pressure.

Trump’s warning that Iran’s energy infrastructure could be “obliterated” if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened further illustrates a strategy rooted in coercive diplomacy. By combining credible threats with continued negotiations, Washington appears to be seeking maximum leverage in shaping the outcome of the conflict.

In sum, U.S. policy toward Iran currently rests on three interrelated pillars: the pursuit of decisive military advantage, the redistribution of financial burdens to regional allies, and the simultaneous deployment of escalation and diplomacy. This approach creates a volatile yet strategically calculated environment—one in which the risks of escalation remain high, but the possibility of a rapid, albeit incomplete, resolution persists.

Interview with Oden Aghapoor (Reza) on the War Between Israel, the United States, and Iran

Oden Aghapoor is an expert on Iranian affairs. He was born in the Azerbaijani region of Iran, also known as South Azerbaijan. He previously worked as a journalist in Iran, where he advocated for the rights and freedoms of Azerbaijanis and published numerous articles on the subject. Notably, he became the youngest editor-in-chief at the national level in Iran’s history.

Aghapoor is the author of eight books—four in Azerbaijani and four in Swedish—and has written hundreds of articles covering global affairs, geopolitical challenges, politics and society, energy security, and education. In 2004, after his newspaper Asan was shut down, he fled to Sweden.

In Sweden, he has primarily worked as an educator, school leader, and project manager. He also lectures on leadership and societal development. While he is considered one of the most active and well-integrated immigrants in Sweden, contributing significantly to society, his commitment to the قضية of South Azerbaijan and its struggle has never diminished.

He has also served as the youngest-ever chairman of the Azerbaijani National Federation in Sweden. In addition, he has conducted research and authored numerous academic and strategic analyses on Azerbaijan.

Today, he will answer a series of questions regarding Iran.

On the war and its trajectory

The war between Iran, the United States, and Israel has escalated significantly. What will determine how and when this conflict ends? Is a negotiated settlement still possible?

The outcome will depend primarily on internal developments in Iran. If the regime weakens further, the conflict may shorten. A negotiated settlement is possible, but current dynamics favor escalation over diplomacy.

 What are the most realistic short-term scenarios?

Continued escalation, targeted military operations, and increasing internal instability in Iran. There is also a growing risk of regional spillover as central authority weakens.

On the future of the Iranian regime

How stable is the Iranian regime today, and could it collapse? What happens if it does not fall?

The regime is deeply weakened, facing internal unrest and external pressure. Collapse is possible. If it survives, it will likely become more authoritarian, accelerating internal divisions and long-term instability.

On South Azerbaijan and internal dynamics

What is the position of South Azerbaijanis in the current situation? What opportunities and risks does this moment create?

South Azerbaijanis are not a minority—we are a major nation. We are fighting for fundamental human and national rights long denied. This moment creates opportunity for change, but also risks of chaos.

What internal challenges could emerge in Iran if the situation deteriorates further?

Power struggles, ethnic tensions, and fragmentation. Without recognition of national rights, Iran risks not transition, but disintegration.

On Reza Pahlavi and the opposition

Reza Pahlavi is often presented as a leading alternative. How do you assess his role and support? Would Azerbaijanis support him?

His support is limited and largely among Persian groups. Azerbaijanis will never accept him. His father’s regime massacred over 30,000 activists after 21 Azar 1946 and occupied South Azerbaijan.

Under that rule, our language, identity, and institutions were banned. This historical trauma remains alive. For us, Pahlavi represents oppression—not a democratic future.

On geopolitical risks

What are the broader geopolitical risks of this conflict? How might it reshape the Middle East and global energy security?

The risks include regional war, energy disruption, and internal collapse of Iran. It could reshape borders, strengthen national movements, and significantly impact global energy markets.

On threats and challenges facing South Azerbaijan

What threats and challenges does South Azerbaijan face today?

Beyond Tehran’s refusal to grant our rights, armed terrorist groups threaten our territory. Over 500,000 refugees have created serious pressure, with some attempting to claim land.

We want peace and coexistence with all neighboring peoples. But we will never accept occupation of our cities or any attempt to divide or take our land.

On your organization and political vision

As a spokesperson for the South Azerbaijan Coordination Platform, can you describe your mission and priorities?

We work to unite national forces, strengthen national consciousness, and defend the human and national rights of South Azerbaijanis through civic, political, and international engagement.

Our priority is unity, organization, and ensuring our people’s will shapes their future.

What is your core political message regarding the future?

Our position is clear: if our fundamental human and national rights are not secured—by this regime or any future one—then our only remaining option is an independent South Azerbaijan.

Strategic Overview

The future of Iranafter the Islamic Republic will not be determined solely by regime change, but by the unresolved national question that has defined the state for more than a century: how a deeply multi-ethnic society can coexist within a centralized political structure built on Persian dominance. Contrary to the prevailing international narrative, the groups labeled as “minorities” in Iran collectively constitute a demographic majority. More than 60 percent of the population is non-Persian, a reality that fundamentally challenges any attempt to restore a unitary, centralized post-Islamic state.

Without an inclusive political framework, Iran risks not transition — but fragmentation.

The Ethnic Reality of Iran

Iran is not a homogeneous nation-state. It is a mosaic of peoples with distinct languages, histories, and territorial continuity.

The largest group is the Azerbaijani Turks, numbering over 35 million, concentrated in what is commonly referred to as South Azerbaijan. Turks also constitute more than half of the population of Tehran, Iran’s capital. Beyond this core, Qashqai Turks inhabit southern Iran, Turkmens reside in the northeast, Arabs and Baluchis dominate the south and southeast, while Kurds and Lors populate large parts of the northwest and western regions.

Despite their demographic weight, these groups have been systematically denied cultural, linguistic, and political rights under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic. This structural exclusion has produced not integration, but polarization.

The Opposition’s Structural Failure

One of the most critical weaknesses shaping Iran’s future is the inability of opposition forces to unite. Secular liberals, monarchists, leftists, ethnic movements, and diaspora elites remain deeply fragmented. Many cannot even sit at the same table, let alone articulate a shared vision for governance.

This failure is not merely organizational — it is ideological. The central fault line lies between those who seek to preserve a centralized Persian nation-state and those who demand recognition of Iran’s multi-national reality.

Reza Pahlavi and the Centralization Dilemma

Reza Pahlavi is viewed by some as a potential post-Islamic leader. However, his public statements — echoing the positions of his father and grandfather — have reinforced fears among non-Persian populations. His rhetoric consistently opposes cultural and national rights for non-Persian peoples and has included references to enforcing unity through military power even before any transition of authority.

For many ethnic groups, this signals continuity rather than change. The memory of mass repression, including historical atrocities committed in South Azerbaijan, remains vivid. As a result, large segments of the population view a Pahlavi restoration not as liberation, but as a return to enforced assimilation.

Federalism as the Last Integrative Option

Given these realities, a federal system emerges as the only viable framework capable of preserving Iran’s territorial integrity while addressing its internal contradictions. Under a federal structure, each ethnic nation would govern its own affairs within its historical geography, while participating in a shared state framework.

Federalism offers:

• Political inclusion without forced homogenization

• Local control over culture, language, and education

• Reduced incentives for secession

• A negotiated balance between unity and self-rule

Without such a model, the centrifugal forces within Iran will intensify.

Paths Toward Disintegration

If federalism is blocked, several ethnic groups may pursue independence as a rational alternative.

Azerbaijani Turks, as the largest ethnic group, possess demographic mass, territorial continuity, and external support. A future independent South Azerbaijan could potentially unify with Azerbaijan, often referred to by Azerbaijanis as North Azerbaijan. In such a scenario, both Turkeyand Azerbaijan would likely provide political and strategic backing.

Support for South Azerbaijani self-determination has also been voiced in Israel, including public discussions in the The Jerusalem Postand initiatives by Israeli lawmakers.

In the south, Arab states in the Persian Gulf have historically supported an independent Ahvaz (Al-Ahwaz), a region that contains Iran’s largest oil and gas reserves and represents one of the country’s wealthiest territories.

The Kurdish Question and Regional Risk

The Kurds have struggled for rights for decades and may be closer than ever to achieving statehood. However, unresolved territorial disputes with neighboring ethnic groups and maximalist geographic claims create the risk of violent inter-ethnic conflict. Without negotiated boundaries and power-sharing arrangements, Kurdish independence efforts could destabilize large parts of western Iran.

The Persian Core: Power Without Resources

Persians, who have dominated state institutions since the fall of the Qajar dynasty, are primarily concentrated in arid central regions with limited natural resources. Despite this, they control a disproportionate share of national wealth generated in non-Persian regions.

In a scenario of ethnic self-determination, a reduced Persian state — often referred to by other groups as “Farsestan” — would face significant economic challenges, lacking both energy resources and strategic trade corridors.

Strategic Conclusion

The central question is no longer whether the Islamic Republic will fall, but what replaces it.

If Iran attempts to reproduce a centralized, Persian-dominated state, fragmentation is likely. If it embraces a federal, multi-national framework, peaceful coexistence remains possible. The choice is stark: negotiated transformation or unmanaged disintegration.

For policymakers, regional actors, and international stakeholders, the lesson is clear: stability in post-Islamic Iran depends not on personalities, but on structural inclusion. Without recognition of its true demographic reality, Iran will not transition — it will unravel.